Recent papers have debated the correlation between equipment investment and economic growth, and its compatibility with the Solow model. This paper improves on existing work by starting from an explicit theoretical model, using recent data on human capital, taking a rigorous approach to outliers, using instrumental variables, and taking unobserved heterogeneity into account. Rates of return to investment, and their precision, are estimated. The main finding is that the implied returns to equipment investment are very high in developing countries.
Introduction
This paper investigates a contradiction that has emerged in the empirical growth literature. In a series of papers, De Long and Summers (1991, 1992, 1993, 1994a) have argued that there is a strong link between equipment investment and economic growth. In contrast, Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) suggest that international variation in standards of living and growth rates can be largely explained by a conventional Solow model, augmented with human capital, in which there is no special role for equipment, and no effect of investment on long-run growth.
The central claim of De Long and Summers (henceforth DS) is simple: 'aggregate production functions suggest much smaller effects of equipment investment on growth than those that appear in the post-WWII comparative cross section.' (De Long and Summers 1991, p. 487). They argue that there must be strong externalities associated with equipment investment, which raise total factor productivity growth and thus the overall contribution of equipment to growth. 1 In this paper, I adopt the frameworks introduced by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (henceforth MRW) and by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) to investigate the correlation between equipment investment and growth. There are five principal improvements over the work of DS, and related work of Auerbach et al. (1994) . First, I explicitly adopt a well-known theoretical framework, one which has already been shown to have some success. Second, the treatment of outliers is more rigorous, and closer to the best practice techniques advocated in the statistics literature. Third, to overcome simultaneity bias, I use a set of instruments which is likely to be preferable to those used by DS. Fourth, I use new data on human capital stocks to control for the growth effects of education. Fifth, I take into account the role of unobserved heterogeneity in initial efficiency.
All these improvements are designed to answer one question: can the findings of DS be explained by a version of the Solow growth model? One possible claim is that Auerbach et al. (1994) have already shown the DS results to be compatible with such models. This certainly appears to be true for the OECD sample, but in any case, DS had already acknowledged that the link between equipment investment and growth appears to be weak in Western Europe. In developing countries, the correlation appears to be much stronger (De Long and Summers 1993; Temple and Voth 1996) . Auerbach et al. (1994) acknowledge that the predictions of the Solow model are rejected at the 5% level for the full sample.
The rather arbitrary exclusion of just one country (Botswana) means that the Solow model is no longer rejected, but Auerbach et al. do not explore the exclusion of influential outliers working in the other direction, such as Zambia. The robust regressions and calculations carried out in Temple and Voth (1996) suggest that the Solow model is strongly rejected for the poorest countries. 2 Another paper on this topic is Jones (1994) . He shows that there is a strong negative relationship between economic growth and the relative price of machinery. However, this finding is easily reconciled with the Solow model. As Jones writes, a rise in the price of equipment, and a fall in capital accumulation, 'reduces the growth rate of the economy in any standard growth framework, either in the long run or along a transition path to a new steady state' (Jones, 1994, p. 360) . Thus, although investigating the link between relative prices and growth has some attractions, it does not really answer the question of whether equipment investment is somehow more important than the Solow model suggests. Jones concludes that 'it remains to be determined whether machinery investment is itself a key component of economic growth or whether the relative price of machinery is just a particularly good indicator of distortionary policies in general' (Jones, 1994, p. 381 ). This paper goes some of the way towards answering that question.
The improvements of the present paper over earlier work are discussed in detail below. The paper is organised so that assumptions are successively relaxed. Section 2 sets out the theoretical framework. Section 3 discusses some of the econometric problems. Section 4 carries out simple regressions based on MRW's work, but disaggregating capital into equipment and structures. Section 5 relaxes the assumptions that the regressors are exogenous and that returns to scale are constant. Section 6 assesses sensitivity to measurement error. Section 7 discusses alternatives to the Cobb-Douglas specification. Sections 8 and 9 discuss the interpretation of the results and possible conclusions. The data sources and computer programs used are described in an appendix.
A theoretical framework
In the first part of the paper, I work exclusively with a Cobb-Douglas production function,
where E is the stock of equipment, S is the stock of structures, H is the stock of human capital and L is the labour force. I fit this to cross-country data in the way introduced by Mankiw, Romer and Weil. It might seem that disaggregation could do little to improve the performance of their model, since the inputs in a Cobb-Douglas function are collapsible. We can write (1) as
However, this index of capital is different from that implicit in Mankiw, Romer and Weil's work (K = E + S). Since substitution possibilities between equipment and structures are likely to be imperfect, the index used here may be closer to the correct one. 3 Mankiw, Romer and Weil derived an equation in terms of the investment rate in aggregate physical capital, whereas here I use investment rates for equipment and structures.
The equation is derived as in MRW. Assume that total factor productivity growth is given byȦ
and labour force growth byL
Let s i be an investment rate, averaged over the period, where i indexes equipment (e), structures (s) and human capital (h). The evolution of the accumulable inputs is given byė = s e y − (n + g + δ)e (3)
where y = Y/AL and similarly for e, s and h. In the steady state, these three equations are all equal to zero. We can substitute them into the production function and re-arrange to get
This gives steady-state per capita income as a function of investment rates, the labour force, population growth, total factor productivity growth and the depreciation rate. We can go further and relax the assumption that countries are in their steady state. Approximating around the steady state, as in MRW, gives a standard 'conditional convergence' regression, or growth equation:
Note that in deriving these equations, we have assumed that the aggregate production function has constant returns to scale, as in Auerbach et al. (1993 Auerbach et al. ( , 1994 . This is important, because one interpretation of De Long and Summers' work is that there are strong productivity externalities to equipment investment. Externalities may lead to increasing returns to scale at the aggregate level (Romer, 1986) . In this case, the exponent on equipment in the aggregate production function could be unexpectedly high, since variation in g could be correlated with equipment investment rates. Although increasing returns to scale at the aggregate level has some counterfactual implications (David Romer, 1996, p. 136-7), the assumption of constant returns will be relaxed in section 5.
Deriving rates of return
One apparent problem when estimating equations (4) and (5) is that the depreciation rate δ is assumed to be the same for structures, equipment and human capital. This is obviously restrictive, but using specifications with differing depreciation rates means that the terms in the depreciation rate are inevitably almost perfectly correlated. It is simpler to impose a common depreciation rate, as in MRW. Since the omitted terms are highly correlated with the one that is present, this omission should have little effect on the estimates of the parameters of interest. 4 The depreciation rate is allowed to vary in my calculations of rates of return to different types of investment. The calculations are based on the assumption of profit maximisation, which implies that the gross rate of return to capital will be equal to its marginal product. Hence the rate of return to equipment in the steady state can be derived from
where the second line follows from (3) and the steady state assumption. Similar equations hold for investment in structures and human capital. The figures quoted in the text below are derived using this formula, setting g to 0.02, and following De Long and Summers (1992, p. 188) in setting δ e = 0.15 and δ s = 0.02. 5 Following MRW, δ h is set to 0.03. The factor shares are those estimated in the regressions below. To estimate average returns, population growth rates and investment shares are averaged across the relevant sample.
Although the calculation is clearly somewhat rough and ready, note that the equation estimated here requires fewer approximations than the one used in Auerbach et al. (1993) to interpret the original DS regressions. Thus, it may be a better guide to the compatibility of the results with the Solow model. Another advantage of this framework is that I can present approximate standard errors for the returns to different types of investment. This requires finding standard errors for the technology parameters, using a Taylor series approximation. Call the coefficients on the three investment rates (equipment, structures, human capital) in equation (5)x,ŷ andẑ respectively. Then the technology parameter α is given byx 1 +x +ŷ +ẑ and similarly for the other parameters. For the growth regressions, the expression is similar;α is then given byx θ +x +ŷ +ẑ To find the standard error ofα, I take a first-order Taylor series approximation of the relevant equation around x =x (see Romer 1996, p. 33) , and use the variance-covariance matrix to calculate a consistent estimate of the standard error. The standard error of r e is then simply calculated using equation (6) .
Three econometric problems
There are three important concerns with estimation of equations (4) and (5) and the related DS regressions. The first is that the regressors are likely to be endogenous. At first, I treat them as exogenous, but relax this assumption in section 5. The second problem is that outliers are likely to be present. As with the endogenity problem, this is acknowledged by DS. However, their treatment of outliers, and that of Auerbach et al. (1994) , is flawed. DS point to the importance of Botswana for the results, but argue that 'for every Botswana, a poor outlier economy that our regression fits extremely well, there is a Zambia: a poor economy that our regression fits relatively badly' (De Long and Summers 1993, p. 405). Auerbach et al. (1994) respond to the problem by taking the rather arbitrary decision to exclude Botswana but include Zambia. Although it may seem pedantic to discuss these small changes of sample, they can make an enormous difference to the magnitude and precision of parameter estimates.
While this may seem a rather insoluble difficulty, statisticians have suggested means of outlier detection rather superior to those currently used by economists. Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987) advocate the use of a robust estimator, least trimmed squares, to characterise the most coherent part of the sample. Points that are some distance from the estimated robust regression, as indicated by the residuals, can be excluded from an otherwise straightforward least-squares regression. This technique, a simple version of re-weighted least squares (RWLS), can be seen as a relatively objective way of assessing and overcoming sample sensitivity.
As discussed in Temple (1995) , an important question is the choice of countries to be omitted in the second stage regression. In that paper, the solution is to exclude a sufficient number of countries for the parameters of interest in the RWLS regression to be close to those estimated by least trimmed squares. I adopt this approach in the regressions below.
The third concern with the DS regressions is the presence of initial technical efficiency, lnA(0), in the equations (4) and (5). This is not directly observable, and in omitting it, we must assume that it is uncorrelated with the regressors. In practice, this is unlikely to be the case. Both Islam (1995) and Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996) have presented evidence that this omitted 'fixed effect' is correlated with the regressors, and so standard cross-section estimates are biased. Koop et al. (1995) and Islam (1995) present estimates of technical efficiency for a variety of countries. It is important to note that these measures are highly correlated with equipment investment and, to a lesser extent, investment in structures. The Koop measure, which is for technical efficiency averaged over 1965-90, has a simple correlation with the equipment investment rate of 0.52. This could be seen as supporting De Long and Summers' argument that equipment investment raises efficiency. However, we can also examine the correlation with the estimates of initial efficiency listed in Islam (1995) . This is 0.43 for structures and 0.66 for equipment, both significant at the 1% level. Figure 1 shows the correlation between equipment investment and initial efficiency.
Figure 1: Equipment investment and initial efficiency
Thus, one likely explanation for the results of DS is that equipment investment is correlated with initial technical efficiency, an important omitted variable. Since they estimate equations similar in principle to (5), the differences in initial efficiency will definitely make themselves felt. How can this problem be avoided? One solution would be to use the estimates of Islam (1995) and enter them into the regressions. However, he assumes a different production function to that used here, so this does not seem wholly satisfactory. Another problem is the likelihood of substantial measurement error, since the estimates of initial efficiency are based on the fixed effects in a short panel, and thus are imprecisely estimated.
A different procedure is suggested by the efficiency estimates in Koop et al. (1995) . They estimate stochastic production frontiers which vary across regions, and find that much of the variation in efficiency is intercontinental. Countries in sub-Saharan Africa tend to be the least efficient, below Latin America, North Africa and much of Asia, East Asia and then the countries of the industrialised West. The variation across continents is much greater than the variation within them.
Thus we can simply include regional dummies in the regressions, and examine the effect of these on the investment coefficients. If the equipment-growth correlation is truly driven by the omission of initial efficiency, the introduction of these dummies should substantially lower the estimated returns to equipment investment. 6 The inclusion of intercepts that vary across regions can be seen as a halfwayhouse between cross-section estimation, in which heterogeneity is ignored, and panel data methods, in which the intercepts vary across countries. Although the use of panel data would seem to have advantages, traditional methods like 'within groups' are well known to give disappointing results. Griliches and Mairesse (1995) argue that trying to proxy for the unobserved heterogeneity may be preferable, because it is informative in itself, and because it leaves more identifying variance in the regressors, and hence is a less costly solution. It is also worth noting that conventional panel data transformations are widely thought to exacerbate the effect of measurement errors, a particular problem in the growth context.
It is worth noting that DS (1991) also used continent dummies. Importantly, the growth-equipment relation then appeared weak in the high-productivity sample, while the estimated effect of continent dummies was large. In contrast, for the larger sample, continent dummies appeared to make little difference. One explanation for these puzzling findings is that DS specified their regional dummies inappropriately; in particular, they failed to allow for variation in efficiency and technical progress between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, and between East Asia and the rest of the continent.
The dummies used here are for sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia, and the industrialised countries of the OECD; the remaining group, corresponding to the intercept term, is predominantly North African and Asian. I ran a regression of Islam's efficiency estimates on this set of regional dummies, and found that they explained 75% of the variation in initial efficiency. This suggests that they are a useful proxy for the unobserved heterogeneity.
Income and growth regressions
In Tables 1 and 2 , I present estimates of (4) and (5) respectively. Here and throughout the paper, the standard errors are the jackknife HCSEs discussed by MacKinnon and White (1985) , except when IV estimation is used. I look at three different samples. The first is MRW's 'non-oil' sample of developing and industrialised countries, excluding oil producers. The second starts from the non-oil sample, but excludes countries in the OECD in 1992. The third corresponds to MRW's OECD sample. Thus the three groups can be thought of as world, developing, and industrialised respectively, where the first group is the union of the second two.
Before considering Tables 1 and 2 in more detail, it is useful to think about the predictions of the Solow model. Using the data discussed in section 2 above, the Solow model predicts a factor share of 0.04 for equipment and 0.51 for structures, assuming a return of 20% to both types of investment. This kind of calculation is quite sensitive to assumptions about depreciation rates. If we lower δ e to 0.10 and raise δ s to 0.04, then the expected factor shares are 0.09 and 0.42, again for a return of 20%. Tables 1 and 2 Thus, the key result from Tables 1 and 2 is that the estimated α, the share of equipment, is higher than predicted by the Solow model, and the estimated share of structures (γ) is lower.
How far do these estimates depart from the Solow model's predictions, and are the differences significant? We can use the estimated factor shares to derive implied rates of return for the different types of investment. Using the growth regressions in Table 2 , the estimated return to equipment investment for the nonoil sample with regional dummies is 98%, with a standard error of 15 percentage points. The estimated return to structures investment is 12%, with a standard error of 2 percentage points.
If Botswana is excluded from the sample (results not shown) the return to equipment investment falls only slightly, to 90% with a standard error of 16 percentage points. Looking at the results for the developing country and OECD samples, it is clear that the estimated returns to equipment are driven by the presence of developing countries. For the developing country sample the implied return is about 140% (standard error 25 percentage points). Excluding Botswana lowers this to 124%, with a standard error of 26 percentage points. The returns to structures investment are around 20%.
These results are startling. After Auerbach et al. (1994) , the conventional wisdom seems to be that the role of equipment investment conforms with the Solow model. The estimates here suggest that in fact the Solow model does a poor job of predicting the importance of equipment investment to developing countries. The findings reinforce those of De Long and Summers (1993) and Temple and Voth (1996) , suggesting that the social returns to equipment investment in developing countries are very high.
However, there are several grounds for caution. The most important point is that the omission of technical efficiency is likely to bias the estimated returns to equipment investment upwards, since the two may be positively correlated for many reasons. Another point to make is that these estimates, particularly of the equipment rate of return, are imprecise. The 95% confidence intervals are relatively wide. There is also considerable additional uncertainty, since the correct depreciation rates for equipment and structures are unknown. For instance, if we take the equipment depreciation rate to be 0.08 rather than 0.15, the estimated return to equipment for the non-oil sample is rather lower (63% compared to 98%). Thus, as one might expect, it is not easy to make accurate inferences about returns from the cross-country data.
There are three more concerns with these results. The high return to equipment investment may be driven by simultaneity bias, which will inevitably be a problem in growth-investment regressions (Blomström et al., 1996) . Measurement errors may bias the coefficient estimates. Finally, the Cobb-Douglas technology assumed here may be overly simple. The following sections of the paper assess whether or not the results can be attributed to one or all of these problems.
Simultaneity bias and returns to scale
In their first paper, DS addressed the simultaneity problem from a variety of angles. For our purposes, the most interesting approach lies in their instrumental variable regressions. DS used three different sets of instruments: equipment prices, saving rates, and World Competitiveness Report survey measures of trade orientation. All three sets are unsatisfactory. The saving rate is almost certainly endogenous (Carroll and Weil, 1994 ) and many studies have suggested links between growth and openness, even after conditioning on investment. As for the equipment price, DS (1991) appear to construct an 'orthogonalized' measure that should be uncorrelated with final GDP (De Long and Summers, 1991, p. 473); since growth is the log difference of GDP, and is regressed on initial GDP, it should be uncorrelated with the orthogonalized equipment price. This price will therefore be an extremely weak instrument, and the IV estimates will be biased towards those from OLS.
As De Long and Summers (1991, p. 479) acknowledge, 'it is easy to construct arguments that the instruments used here are endogenous'. Another flaw of their IV estimates is that they ignore the outlier problem discussed earlier.
To overcome these problems, I experimented with estimates of the growth regression (5) over 1975-85, using average investment rates over 1960-75 and 1960 log GDP as instruments. Outliers from robust regressions were omitted at the IV stage. However, in these results -not reported here -the coefficent on equipment investment was imprecisely estimated.
One flaw of these regressions, and most of those in De Long and Summers (1991), is that they are exactly identified. The finite sample properties of the IV estimator in these circumstances may be rather poor, especially if the relevant instrument is only weakly correlated with the endogenous regressor Startz 1990a, 1990b; Bound et al., 1995) . When the instruments are weak, IV estimates tend to be biased in the same direction as those from OLS, which means that the informal Hausman-Wu test of DS is likely to have low power. It is generally desirable for a model to be over-identified to ensure good finite sample properties for the IV estimator; see for instance Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, p. 234 ). The use of over-identifying restrictions, as below, has the added advantage that these can be tested, providing some information about the validity of the instruments. Thus, in the following section, I turn to instrumental variable regressions which are over-identified.
Benhabib-Spiegel regressions
One way of investigating the equipment-growth correlation is simply to log difference a production function, as in Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) . Continuing to use the augmented Solow model, the equation for estimation is ∆ log Y = ∆ log A + α∆ log E + γ∆ log S + β∆ log H + θ∆ log L + ε
where E, S and H are stocks of equipment, structures and human capital respectively. This formulation allows us to relax our previous assumption of constant returns to scale. One advantage of first differencing is that there may be less heterogeneity in rates of technical progress than in levels of efficiency. Another advantage of this change in equation is that the instrumental variable estimates turn out to be more precise.
There are two main econometric problems. The first is the traditional simultaneity problem in estimating production functions: an anticipated shock to output will result in the accumulation of equipment and/or structures, so that the regressors will be correlated with the error term, and the estimates will be inconsistent. The work of Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) on the simultaneity problem suggests that the exponents on capital variables will be biased upwards. Thus, the RWLS estimates presented here should probably be seen as upper bounds on the importance of equipment and structures.
The second problem is the need to assume that technical progress (∆ log A) is uncorrelated with the regressors, so that it can be safely omitted. In practice, this is unlikely to be the case. Benhabib and Jovanovic (1991) point out that even if the underlying stochastic process for technology is the same across countries, the potential for different realizations can lead to biased estimates. To control for differences in efficiency growth that are not picked up by the investment terms, I use regional dummies where possible, as discussed in section 3.
In Table 3 , I present estimates of (7) where the differencing is over the twenty year period, 1965-85. Capital stock data is from the Penn World Table version 5.6. I take the human capital stock H to be the labour force multiplied by average years of schooling, where estimates of the latter are taken from Nehru et al. (1995) . 7 A Wald test of the restriction of constant returns to scale rejects only once, for the sample of developing countries. The rejection of constant returns to scale is strong for this sample, and the high coefficient on the change in labour force indicates that these results should not be trusted, perhaps because of simultaneity bias. Also note that the constant term is significantly negative, indicating either some technical regress, or again that the results are misleading due to simultaneity bias. Table 3 Given the simultaneity problem, I estimated the same equation over 1975-85, using 1965 and 1970 levels as instruments. These results are shown in Table 4 . The main finding is that the coefficient on equipment remains higher than that predicted by the Solow model, although it is slightly less precisely estimated than before. Sargan tests of the over-identifying restrictions (listed as a 'Specification' p-value in the table) do not reject the IV specification.
How effective are the instruments? It is important to check that the instruments are correlated with the endogenous variables; if the instruments are weak then the estimates will be biased towards those of OLS. Looking at the first stage equations, the adequacy of the instruments seems to vary depending on the sample and regression specification. The most reliable estimates are probably those in column 2, a sample and specification for which the instruments used for equipment investment appear to work well.
Note also that the hypothesis of constant returns to scale is not rejected in any of the regressions. In the developing country sample, the constant term is still negative, but no longer significantly. The estimated effect of the change in labour force is also imprecise. Overall, though, the important message to draw from these results is that the high estimated returns to equipment investment are not driven by simultaneity bias. Table 4 6 Measurement error
That the high returns to equipment investment are apparently robust to instrumental variable estimation may surprise some. One remaining objection to the finding could be measurement error: when several variables are measured with error, coefficient estimates may be biased away from zero. Note, however, that the use of instrumental variables should help overcome biases from measurement error. If the error in measurement for the instruments is orthogonal to the error in measurement for the capital stocks, the estimates will be consistent.
I have also investigated sensitivity to measurement error using the diagnostics developed by Klepper and Leamer (1984) , Klepper (1988) , and Klepper et al. (1993) . Multivariate reverse regression is used to derive bounds on the true values of the coefficients, for the 1965-85 regressions listed in Table 3 . In practice, the set of feasible coefficients is unbounded, but further assumptions can be used to remedy this. The assumptions are based on assessments of f i , the fraction of the variation in particular regressors that is attributable to measurement error.
For the whole sample, the coefficient on equipment is bounded below by 0.11, when the fraction of error variation in the change in the stock of structures is constrained to be no more than 0.3. If this constraint is tightened to 0.20, then the equipment coefficient appears to be at least 0.14. As discussed earlier, coefficients of this magnitude are potentially compatible with the Solow model.
The picture changes slightly when attention is restricted to the developing countries. Here, the most useful bounds are those on the fraction of variation in human capital stock growth due to measurement error. Constraining this fraction to 0.4, and thus allowing for substantial measurement error, gives a coefficient on equipment bounded below by 0.34. This is about three times the figure implied by the Solow model, as discussed in section 4 above.
I have also calculated the bounds for the regressions in De Long and Summers (1993), but excluding outliers. These results suggest that the lower bound on the equipment investment ratio is around 0.20, when making pessimistic assumptions about the extent of measurement error. This coefficient does not have a direct interpretation as the exponent of equipment, but it can be compared with those in Table 2 , which are quite similar. Overall, it appears that the DS results cannot be easily explained by measurement error biases.
Different production functions
As is common in the growth literature, including the work on equipment investment of Abel (1992), Auerbach et al. (1993 Auerbach et al. ( , 1994 and Greenwood et al. (1996) , I have started from a simple Cobb-Douglas specification for aggregate technology. In this section, I discuss some reasons why we might want to relax this assumption, and present some findings based on more general functional forms.
For present purposes, Cobb-Douglas has its flaws. It is reasonable in that all inputs are necessary for production, but it may imply too great a possibility of substitution between equipment and structures. To see this, consider a simple example in which equipment and structures have the same exponent. Halving equipment and doubling structures would leave output unchanged. 8 Substitution possibilities between equipment and structures have been studied by Berndt and Christensen (1973) , Woodland (1975) , Denny and May (1978) , and Williams and Kwon (1982). Berndt and Christensen, looking at US manufacturing between 1925 and 1968, found a high elasticity of substitution between equipment and structures (σ ES = 7.11). The other studies, for Canadian and South Korean industries, found that equipment and structures are complements, with σ ES ranging from -1.61 to -0.02. As these elasticities suggest, no study found that technology is adequately described by the Cobb-Douglas form. It is also clear that estimation of simple aggregate production functions gives somewhat suspect results.
One defence of using Cobb-Douglas here is that, as in MRW and Auerbach et al. (1993) , we can use it to derive an equation for estimation entirely in terms of investment rates. A related advantage is its inherent simplicity: the function is easy to work with and interpret. Given the difficulties of aggregation, one would obviously be rather wary of seeing the Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function as a rigorous description of technology. As Solow (1966 Solow ( , p. 1259 Solow ( -1260 wrote, it is 'either an illuminating parable or else a mere device for handling data, to be used so long as it gives good empirical results, and to be abandoned as soon as it doesn't, or as soon as something better comes along'.
If one dislikes the aggregate production framework, one can see the regressions in this paper simply as alternative formulations of cross-country growthinvestment regressions. However, the lack of rigour is potentially damaging when considering the question of returns to scale, and the correlation between total factor productivity growth rates and equipment investment. More sophisticated descriptions of technology might well give different answers. In this section I first adopt a linearly homogeneous CES index of capital, using the Sato (1967) idea of a two level production function. Then, I investigate the correlation between equipment investment and several measures of total factor productivity growth, taken from growth accounting and stochastic frontier studies.
The simplest way to extend previous work is to use the two level production function,
This is log differenced as before, and estimated by non-linear least squares for 1965-85 for all 48 countries for which data is available. The same set of regional dummies is used. The elasticity of substitution between equipment and structures, σ ES , is estimated to be 0.80, with a standard error of 0.54, so it is not significantly different from one, but also very imprecise. The estimate of the capital share α is 0.26 (s.e.=0.08) and the labour share θ is 0.65 (s.e.=0.31), while the human capital share is imprecisely estimated (β=0.05, s.e.=0.11). The factor intensity parameter, φ, is estimated to be 0.82 with a standard error of 0.28.
These results may be affected by influential outliers. There is no simple way to identify outliers in a non-linear model, so I exclude the observations identified as outliers in the linear model used in Table 3 (Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Norway, Sierra Leone and Venezuela). The estimated elasticity of substitution σ ES is now 0.97 with a standard error of 0.43. The estimates of technology parameters are slightly different when outliers are excluded: the capital share is estimated to be 0.43 (0.07), the human capital share 0.29 (0.12) and the labour share 0.22 (0.33). Imposing constant returns to scale makes little difference to these results.
From the production function (8) we can calculate the gross marginal products of equipment and structures, and hence the average returns. Differentiating the production function gives
I use these formulae to calculate the returns in 1985 for each country, based on the first set of results (σ ES = 0.80). Averaging across all countries in the non-oil sample for which data is available, the point estimate of the return to equipment is around 120% and the return to structures around 20%. As might be expected given that the estimated elasticity of substitution is close to one, the results are not too different from those based on the Cobb-Douglas function. Thus, it seems that a simple generalisation of the Cobb-Douglas function is not enough to undermine the evidence for high returns to equipment investment.
Investment and other measures of TFP growth
This section presents results from more general growth accounting exercises. It is clear from their work that DS view the growth-equipment correlation as evidence that equipment investment raises total factor productivity, not just labour productivity. In several of their papers (1992, 1993, 1994a ) they construct measures of total factor productivity and relate these to equipment investment. The findings depend to a large extent on assumptions about the share of capital in the production function:
For the very highest capital share we consider [50 per cent]...the association between TFP growth and equipment investment ceases to be stronger than the association between TFP growth and structures investment.
De Long and Summers (1992, p. 191) Note that a capital share of 50% may well be realistic for many developing countries. DS go on to add that, even in this case, both structures and equipment investment remain correlated with TFP growth, which contradicts the Solow model. It is difficult to see, however, how structures investment could raise TFP growth. The correlation may be evidence that causation runs in the other direction, from technical change to investment; but also note the argument of Jones (1994) that equipment investment may be an important determinant of investment in structures.
In this section, I investigate the links between investment and TFP growth using estimates taken from other sources. The first is Maddison (1987, p. 665), who presents estimates of what he calls joint factor productivity growth for six OECD countries over 1950-84, obtained using traditional growth accounting methods. These estimates appear to be positively correlated with 1960-85 investment in both equipment and structures; see figures 2 and 3.
Figure 2: Equipment investment and TFP growth
Given that the correlation is present for structures investment as well as equipment, it is difficult to know what interpretation should be placed upon it.
Since it is rather difficult to establish a causal link from structures investment to technical change, it seems likely that causality lies in the other direction. The development of new products and processes naturally invites higher rates of investment in both equipment and structures. Alternatively, the correlation could be the outcome of some third variable, like a favourable policy environment.
In a technically sophisticated study, Koop et al. (1995, p. 35 ) present estimates of technical progress for forty-four countries, over 1965-90, based on Bayesian estimation of stochastic production frontiers that are allowed to vary across regional groupings. In fig. 4 , the estimates of productivity growth are plotted against equipment investment over 1960-85.
Here, the correlation between equipment investment and productivity growth appears to be rather weak. To the extent that there is any estimated relationship (the simple correlation is 0.34) it is driven by outliers such as Venezuela, Hong Kong, and Japan. The correlation between structures investment and growth is 
Interpreting the results
In assessing their work on equipment investment and growth, De Long and Summers (1994b) wrote that:
It seems to us that our work is vulnerable because our data are of poorer quality than we might wish, and because the direction of causation and the isolation of other possible influences is extremely difficult.
De Long and Summers (1994b, p. 806).
The work in this paper, using different techniques, suggests that the findings of DS are driven neither by measurement error nor by simultaneity bias. Robust estimation has also been used, to ensure that the findings are not driven by influential outliers like Botswana. On this evidence, the emphasis of De Long and Summers (1993) on the importance of equipment investment to developing countries does not seem misplaced. The attention given so far to criticising the econometric basis of their results might be better directed at interpretating the findings.
There remain difficulties in interpreting the high observed returns to equipment investment. The estimates support the claim of DS that equipment investment increases total factor productivity growth, and hence is more important than the Solow model implies. However, it is hard to see why the suggested mechanisms, like learning-by-doing on new machines, do not seem to be strongly present in developed countries. As we saw in section 7, equipment investment is correlated with TFP growth in a small group of industrialised countries, but so too is investment in structures.
It may be that the equipment-growth correlation is driven by the omission of relevant variables, particularly initial efficiency. However, using regional dummies should account for a large extent of the unobserved heterogeneity; and high returns are found even in the presence of these dummies. Sachs and Warner (1995) find that estimates of the effect of equipment are imprecise when variables representing openness and natural resource endowments are both added to crosscountry regressions. However, they work with the whole sample, rather than the group of developing countries for which the effect of equipment is strongest.
One is perhaps led towards the view that the correlation reflects the varying outcomes of industrialization in developing countries, rather than externalities of the sort emphasised by DS. This argument is elaborated in more detail in Temple and Voth (1996) . However, the results using the Koop et al. measure of productivity growth (section 7) suggest that the high estimated returns to equipment investment are not simply the outcome of structural change accompanied by fast total factor productivity growth.
Alternative explanations may need to be considered. One argument is that investment in structures affects output over a relatively long period, so new structures do not have much effect; the introduction of new machines will have an almost immediate impact. Regressions of the type used by DS, over ten, twenty, or twenty-five years, may over-rate the importance of equipment investment at the expense of structures.
Abel (1992) provides a subtle explanation of the high coefficient on equipment investment. If such investment rises over the time period, and then its average is used in a regression, the estimated coefficient will tend to be rather higher than if the investment ratio was constant. However, this effect does not seem to have been important. It can be assessed by considering the data in De Long and Summers (1991), which lists average shares for 1960-75 and 1975-85. Those figures suggest that, although the average equipment investment ratio did rise in many developing countries over the period, the increases were quite small, the differences between the two averages typically being less than two percentage points. Thus it seems unlikely that Abel's mechanism explains the high implied returns to equipment investment.
There is another explanation for the results which may be more promising. An important recent paper by Greenwood et al. (1996) emphasises the role of investment-specific technological change in post-war US productivity growth. Taking the view that new capital goods embody technical change does not, in itself, undermine the finding of high social returns to equipment investment; DS have always acknowledged that their results may be driven by technology transfer. However, it seems likely that when new technology is adopted, it requires investments in training and reorganization as well as those in machinery. Thus, regressions based on equipment capital stocks will tend to overstate the returns to equipment investment, because they omit these additional necessary costs of investment-specific technology adoption.
My view is that this argument may explain, at least in part, the high estimated returns. Even so, the results in this paper (and those of DS) still make a case for investment subsidies, and perhaps even incentives designed to shift the composition of investment from structures to equipment. If the latter policy is recommended, it should be remembered that one side effect of lower investment in structures will be to reduce the returns to equipment investment. More generally, Temple and Voth (1996) briefly discuss some ways in which investment subsidies may be dominated by other policies, for instance support for firms importing foreign technology. In particular, subsidies to equipment investment may be wasteful when they are taken up by industrial sectors like mining, energy generation, and construction.
Conclusions
In using the augmented Solow model, I have attempted to place additional structure on the regressions carried out by De Long and Summers, and thereby control more rigorously for the roles of human capital and labour force growth, and for heterogeneity in initial efficiency. Given earlier work, it is perhaps not wholly surprising to find that equipment investment is often weakly correlated with growth in the OECD, but strongly so in a large group of developing countries. What is surprising is the magnitude of the estimated returns to equipment investment -well over 50%, and much higher than the estimated returns to investment in structures. Instrumental variable estimates suggest that these results are not driven by simultaneity bias. Nor do they depend on the inclusion of influential outliers like Botswana.
The picture emerging from De Long and Summers (1993), Jones (1994), Lee (1995) and this paper is that equipment investment has special importance. Thus, despite the claims otherwise of Auerbach et al. (1994) , one should acknowledge that the data for developing countries do suggest that social returns to equipment investment are very high, as De Long and Summers have argued. The difficulty now lies in interpreting this result. It may be that these kind of regressions overstate the returns to equipment investment projects, since they omit some of the important costs of technology transfer like information gathering, training, and reorganization.
Although the estimates presented here can hardly be the last word, it will be difficult to learn more from further cross-section regressions. In investigating the effect of investment on TFP growth, the next step is to make use of time series data, perhaps at the industry level. Estimates of TFP change within different industries, as in Bernard and Jones (1996) , could be correlated with equipment investment. Time series estimates of TFP growth, and corresponding data on equipment investment, would also provide useful further evidence on the pattern of causation.
Appendix
The dummies for sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean, are taken from Easterly and Levine (1996) , and are based on World Bank definitions. The East Asia dummy is set to one for Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. The industrialized countries dummy is set to one for the 1992 OECD sample used by MRW, plus Israel. Tables 1 and 2 
Material for referees
The samples are based on those in De Long and Summers (1993), but excluding outliers. To obtain the bounds, restrictions are placed on f i , the fraction of the variation in each variable that is attributable to measurement error, or on R * 2 , the R 2 of the regression if all measurement error in the independent variables was eliminated. See Klepper (1988) and Klepper et al. (1993) for a discussion, and the method of deriving the bounds. Notes f LAB is the fraction of the variation in labour force growth that can be attributed to measurement error. R * 2 is the R 2 of the regression if all measurement error in the independent variables was eliminated. See Klepper et al. (1993) for further details.
